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This study was aimed to estimate how cash transfer to children could help to reduce their 
poverty as well as to increase access to education, health and other material life conditions. 
We find that cash transfers would have a positive effect of income on school enrolment: a one 
percent increase in per capita income could lead to a 0.0394 percent increase in the 
probability of children’s primary and secondary school enrolment. In addition, increased 
income resulted from cash transfers could significantly increase out-of-pocket (OOP) 
spending on education: a one percent increase in per capita income could help households 
increase OOP spending on education and OOP spending on education excluding tuition fee by 
0.883 percent and 0.454 percent, respectively. Finally, the simulations show that generally the 
transfer amount of VND 70,000/month/child (which was merely 2.31% of GDP per capita in 
2012) could increase the school enrolment rate of children by 0.125 percent. However, there 
were no significant effects of cash transfers on health care contacts (both impatience and 
outpatience) and out-of-pocket spending on health care. 
Keywords: Cash transfers, children, health, education, Vietnam. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
 
Viet Nam’s economic and social transitions from a low to a middle income country, from an 
agricultural to an industrial economy, and from a young to an aging society are focusing the 
attention of policy makers towards systematically strengthening the formal social protection 
system. Formal social protection, including social assistance, has been increasingly replacing 
the traditional informal intra-family or community support mechanisms as the latter has been 
weaken due to migration and the transition from extended, multi-generational families to 
nuclear ones.  While Viet Nam’s traditional social assistance and formal poverty reduction 
policies emphasized in-kind and geographically-targeted programs addressing structural 
sources of poverty in remote regions, the use of household- and individual-based cash transfer 
programs has substantially expanded over the last few years. However, a close examination of 
Viet Nam’s current formal social assistance and poverty reduction system reveals important 
policy and implementation gaps that risk hampering the long-term poverty and vulnerability 
reduction (see, for instance, Evans et al., 2012). Moreover, the delivery systems for social 
assistance programs are weak, resulting in ineffective service delivery (Giang et al., 2011; 
UNDP, 2014). 
The major formation of the social assistance system, started in 1990s, has not really 
undergone major reform as of yet. Viet Nam’s social protection system today suffers from 
fragmentation of multiple poverty reduction and social assistance programs with overlapping 
objectives but separate budgeting and delivery mechanisms. There are a number of cash 
transfer programs, both regular and one-off, to be implementing in Viet Nam. These include 
most prominently (i) monthly cash support to the disabled, orphans, single parents and lone 
older people without retirement and other social insurance benefits under Decree 
136/2013/ND-CP (ii) a small monthly cash transfer to poor households to offset recent 
increases in energy prices under Decision 268/2011/QÐ-TTg (both delivered through local 
social officers), and (iii) a cash transfer to children from poor households in school for nine 
months per year delivered through the education system (school principals) under Decree 
74/2013, and healthcare subsidies. In 2013, a new program was developed to give additional 
education support to high school students in remote and difficult areas (under Decree 
12/2013/ND-CP). This fragmentation creates considerable inefficiency both from the 
perspectives of the implementers and the beneficiaries.   
At the same time, the social protection system does not provide adequate protection. 
Benefit incidence analysis on the basis of the Viet Nam Household Living Standard Survey 
(VHLSS) 2010 shows that the main existing social assistance programs have limited coverage 
of the poor, considerable leakage to the non-poor and low benefit adequacy. For example, in 
2010, only 24% of bottom quintile households were covered by education subsidies, while  
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43% and 54% of spending under these programs accrued to bottom quintile households, 
respectively. Education subsidies accounted for only 4% of consumption of the bottom 
quintile households.   
Viet Nam has a well-established mechanism to identify the poor but with a considerable 
scope for strengthening. While targeting accuracy is reasonable at the national and regional 
levels, there is evidence of considerable exclusion errors in rural areas and for ethnic 
minorities. In 2010, for instance, 70% of households on the poverty list were poor, and 50% 
were extremely poor, but only 52% of the extreme poor were on the poverty list, and 36% of 
the total poor (World Bank, 2012). A recent study by Castel et al., (2015) confirmed such a 
situation again: in 2012, 7.9 million (or nearly 52%) among 15.3 million poor were excluded 
from the MOLISA’ list of poor households. There are methodological and governance-related 
deficits. Commune authorities conduct a poverty census every five years until 2015, and is 
then updated annually. There is also no valid national/provincial household database to be 
used for all assistance programs which support the same population or heavily rely on 
classification of poor and near-poor status. This has resulted in duplication of efforts by 
various government agencies in developing separate beneficiary lists for each program, 
creating burden for administrative staff at the local level. Finally, there are weaknesses related 
to availability of information, the transparency of processes and oversight as well as 
complaints and grievance redress. 
The benefit schemes for children are currently based on very narrow categorical 
targeting and are not efficiently addressing neither income nor non-income deprivations that 
children aged 0-15 are experiencing. Under the current regulations, children aged 0-3 are 
totally missing, except those who are eligible under Decree 136/2013.    
Aligned with the Resolution 15-NQ/TW dated on 1 June 2012 in the Fifth Meeting of 
Central Party Committee XI on some issues in social policies in the 2012-2020 period, 
Ministry of Labour, War Invalids and Social Affairs (MOLISA) has been tasked by the 
Government with the development of the Government’s Action Plan for Implementation of 
the Resolution 15 issued under Resolution No.70/NQ-CP dated on 1st November 2012 and 
development of a Master Plan for Social Assistance Reform (MPSAR), as identified in the 
Decision 1791/QĐ-LDTBXH dated 6th December 2012. Viet Nam is currently undertaking a 
dynamic social protection reform towards a rights-based, inclusive and transformative system 
to meet the standards and demands of a middle-income country where poverty reduction 
requires intensified and diversified approaches to remove multiple vulnerabilities and 
deprivations, rather than focusing on income alone. The reform promotes: (i) reviewing the 
refining the concept of social assistance (ii) rights-based and life-cycle approach; (iii) 
investment in social protection as an investment in human capital and human development; 
(iv) more coherent, inclusive, progressive and comprehensive that could effectively respond 
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to multiple forms of resilience (especially the vulnerable groups such as elderly, disabled, 
children and pregnant women, victims of natural disasters and others); and (v) review of the 
current governance structure and service delivery mechanisms / institutional arrangements 
and staff capacity, define bottlenecks and recommend actions for improvements. Various 
development partners (such as World Bank, UNICEF, ILO, UNDP, GIZ, UNFPA, and Irish 
Aid) are supporting MOLISA to embark on the discussion of social assistance reform through 
many initiatives, namely some as the study on social transfers (GIZ, 2011), review on social 
assistance policies (UNDP, 2013), social protection floor, aging issues and social insurance 
scheme (ILO & UNFPA, 2014), pilot the consolidation of three policies targeting the poor 
households with children going to school and pregnant women and implement cash transfer 
program - Opportunities (namely, WB/UNICEF Social Assistance System Strengthening 
Project (SASSP) Project), and a series of six studies on design, implementation and financial 
situation of the current social assistance programs (UNDP & ILSSA, 2015).  
Viet Nam’s social protection reform takes place at an opportune time as the global 
momentum crystalized into commitment around towards a specific goal of social protection in 
the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), calling for the implementation of nationally 
appropriate social protection systems and measure for all, including floors, and by 2030 
achieve substantial coverage of the poor and vulnerable. The Third Financing for 
Development Conference to be held in Addis Ababa reinforces the commitment towards 
nationally appropriate social protection systems and measures for all, and exploring 
sustainable financing options vis-à-vis the evolving financing capacity. Riding on the 
momentum, the ILO-World Bank joint statement on universal social protection also called for 
a shared vision to promote social protection throughout the life-cycle as an investment for 
sustained social and economic development as well as social inclusion.   
In 2011, MOLISA, with support of UNICEF, conducted a simulation of possible child 
benefit schemes, prior to the start of the SASSP Project and the MPSAR Project. Building on 
SASSP and policy discussions around consolidation already underway, UNICEF has 
identified an opportunity to update the analysis and review the proposed policy options to 
inform the reform processes. 
The overall objective of this research is to provide a mapping exercise for child-support 
policies in Viet Nam over the past 10 years, and conduct micro-simulations to measure the 
impact of cash transfer to children at different age groups on their welfare (such as poverty 
reduction, and access to education and health). 
The specific objectives of the research are to: (i) list various policies and programs for 
children in the past 10 years, (ii) quantify the impacts of child benefits on children’s welfare 
(such as poverty reduction, and access to education and health), and (iii) provide different 
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options/scenarios with respective costs, from a universal coverage (i.e., for all children) to 
some targeted beneficiaries (such as those living in rural areas). 
This research comprises of five parts, as follows. In Part II, we will provide a literature 
of the existing studies, which used ex-ante simulation techniques to calculate the impact of 
cash transfer programs for children or households with children in different countries on their 
poverty, education, and health-related aspects. In particular, we will discuss in details the 
data, research methods, and the key findings of these studies, which will be then used to 
compare and contrast with our findings for Viet Nam in the later parts of the research.  Part III 
will analyze data used in this research. Specifically, we will summarize key characteristics of 
the Viet Nam Household Living Standard Survey (VHLSS) in 2010 and 2012. Then, we will 
provide a detailed description of methods to reach the aforementioned research purposes. In 
Part IV, we will present key findings with policy recommendations for further discussion. 
Specifically, we will provide detailed analysis on the impacts of cash transfer to children on 
their welfare. The last part will conclude the research. 
II. A REVIEW OF EXISTING STUDIES 
Since the 1990s, a number of poor and developing countries have conducted conditional 
and unconditional cash transfer programs (CCTs or UCTs, in short). Although different 
countries have different designs and implementation arrangements, they all focus on various 
groups of poor and vulnerable people with aims to reduce poverty and increase access to 
education and health care services for individual beneficiaries and their households. Some 
such well-known programs as Food for Education in Bangladesh, Bolsa Escola in Brazil, and 
Progresa in Mexico. With respect to children as the ultimate beneficiaries, there are various 
conditions for beneficiaries and their households to follow; for instance, to receive cash 
transfer, it is commonly required that children of school-age remain enrolled and actually 
school attended (such as Bolsa Escola in Brazil), while pre- and post-natal visits for pregnant 
women or lactating mothers are obligatory (such as Progresa in Mexico). 
The implementation of these programs has generated considerable interests in both 
academic and policy-making perspectives, and as such a great deal of effort has been placed 
in evaluating the impact of these programs. In practice, there are two impact evaluation 
approaches, i.e., ex-post methods and ex-ante methods. The ex-post methods aim to compare 
the beneficiaries with non-beneficiaries after controlling for selection. They are meant to 
identify the actual effects of a program on various dimensions of household welfare using 
direct observation of people engaged in the program and comparing them with those – who 
are carefully selected as comparison group – in the same dimensions. The ex-ante methods 
aim to simulate the effects of the program using data from households, in which assumptions 
on coverage and benefit levels are applied to determine whether an individual or a household 
qualifies for the program, how their poverty will reduce, and how much it will cost for 
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providing such a program. Ex-ante and ex-post evaluation methods are complements, rather 
than substitutes (Bourguignon et al., 2002). 
Since the past decade, there have been a number of ex-ante studies quantifying the 
impacts of cash transfer programs on children and their households. Various welfare aspects 
are explored, but most of them are about impacts on poverty, school attendance, and health 
care access. 
First, studies about the impact of cash transfer programs on poverty status of children 
and their households. Bourguignon et al., (2002) used data from the 1999 PNAD (Pesquisa 
National por Amostra de Domicilios) household survey combined with those from the Bolsa 
Escola in Brazil to evaluate whether it contributed to reducing poverty of children. They 
found that the impact on poverty and inequality was positive – indicated by lower poverty rate 
and Gini coefficient – but at low magnitude (reduced by only one percentage point and half a 
point, respectively). More importantly, the authors concluded that the program appeared to be 
well-targeted to the poor, and thus if it failed to lift the poor above the poverty line, this would 
be a consequence of the small size of the transfers rather than of the targeting method. 
UNICEF (2009) conducted micro-simulations for the Western and Central African 
countries to see how different child benefit program would impact on child poverty. The 
findings showed that a universal program providing a benefit equal to 30% of the poverty line 
to every child aged 0-14 would have the greatest impact on child poverty. In particular, some 
countries would experience substantial poverty reduction for children, such as the program 
would reduce child poverty headcount ratio by 27.6% in Mali, 18.5% in Congo, and 16.9% in 
Senegal.  
Amarante et al., (2009) used an ex-ante evaluation approach to estimate the effects of 
Asignaciones Familiares – an Uruguayan child allowances program – on teenager’s poverty, 
inequality, and labor supply. They found that that the program could reduce extreme poverty 
significantly, and the transfer might strongly influence adult labor supply.  Van den Berg and 
Nguyen (2011) found cash transfers help poverty reduction in Vietnam. 
UNICEF Mongolia (2007) estimated how the CCT for families with children, namely 
Mongolia’s Child Money Programme (CMP), could contribute to poverty reduction for 
children. The research compared the actual performance of the CMP during January 2005 to 
June 2006 with the simulated expected performance of the CMP in its more recent ‘universal’ 
phase with two different assumptions (i.e., the initial benefit level of $31 per child per year 
and an increase to $117 as approved in the 2007 budget). The estimates showed that the 
targeted program resulted in very high leakage to non-poor households and substantial 
exclusion of poor households due to flaws in the program’s proxy means-test and 
implementation problems. The paper also advocated that retaining the new universal benefit 
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would further reduce child poverty headcount and was progressive along the entire household 
expenditure distribution due to the heavier concentration of children in the lower deciles.1 
Also applying ex-ante impact evaluation approach, Son and Florentino (2008) explored 
how the CCT in the Philippines could help reduce poverty of children and their household. 
Their estimates pointed out that the CCT would have medium impact on the headcount ratio 
but its impact increase rapidly when moving to the poverty gap ratio and poverty severity 
index. In specific, the transfer of PhP 300 targeted to the only poor children helped reduce 
32.3% of headcount ratio, 53.6% of poverty gap, and 65.2% of poverty severity. One of the 
important message of this research was that the transferred level of PhP 300 per child per 
month was equivalent only to 1.5% of the Philippines’ GDP per capita and merely 27% of the 
average official national poverty line, and thus it was not sizeable enough to have significant 
impact on poverty alleviation. 
For the case of Sri Lanka, Kurama and Pfau (2010) showed that a cash transfer scheme 
providing a transfer equivalent to 50% of the poverty line to all school-age children would 
have been able to reduce child poverty rate by 59.57% (or to 6.96%) and for the whole 
population by 42.94% (or to 7.72%). They also argued that the marginal poverty reduction 
would decrease as the benefit level increased and even a small benefit could have a significant 
impact on poverty for all children as well as the total population. Besides, poverty reduction 
efficiency tended to decline when increasing the maximum eligible from 12 to 18 years. 
Also evaluating the impact on poverty of the CCT programs in Cambodia, Meng and 
Pfau (2010) applied ex-ante micro-static simulation techniques with the data of the 
Cambodian Socio-Economic Survey (CSES) in 2004 to quantify the potential impact on 
poverty of cash transfer schemes provided to various groups of school-age children. They 
pointed out that a CCT program directly targeting the poor group could help to reduce the 
poverty rate significantly, even in case of budget limitation.  
Popova (2014) analyzed programs of cash allowances for children and compared their 
effectiveness in combating child poverty in Russia and four EU countries (including Sweden, 
Germany, Belgium, and the United Kingdom). Using microsimulation models (respectively 
named RUSMOD and EUROMOD), the paper estimated how much the potential gains would 
have been if the Russian system was re-designed along the policy parameters of four EU 
countries, and vice versa. The results confirmed that the poverty impact of the program design 
was smaller than that of the level of spending. Other conditions being equal, the best 
outcomes for children were achieved by applying the mix of universal and means-tested child 
benefits as those in Belgium and the United Kingdom. Also, the Russian design of child 
                                                          
1
 From 2015, CMP now offers UCT to all children under 18 years 
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allowances did not appear to be less effective than those in other countries in terms of its 
impact on child poverty. 
With Australian case, Hayes and Redmond (2014) explored impact of cash transfers for 
families on their children. Using a new Australian microsimulation model (namely, ATM) 
built on the EUROMOD platform, the authors examined the extent to which policies to 
support families with children through the tax and transfer system have been achieved at the 
expense of gender equity, and how the system could be better designed to achieve child 
poverty reduction with gender equity. The results suggested that a universal family payment 
that would both improve incentives and reduce child poverty was potentially affordable. The 
authors also noted that it would be politically difficult to have such a scheme since the main 
gainers would be families with children in the top half of the income distribution, while the 
main losers would be taxpayers who did not have dependent children. 
Recently, UNICEF Pacific and Fiji Ministry of Women, Children and Poverty 
Alleviation (2015) conducted simulations for providing FJD 30 per month to all children (or a 
universal scheme), and the estimates showed that poverty rates of children aged 0-11 and 0-6 
would be reduced by 9% and 5%, respectively. 
Second, studies about the impact of cash transfer programs on children’s early 
childhood development and school enrolments and/or attendance. Regarding early 
childhood development, a report by Ministerio de Educación (2007) [as quoted in Sanfilippo 
et al., 2012] showed that Chile Crece Contigo, which was operated as an early-childcare 
program to encourage pre-school participation if the parents could not take care of their 
children during the day, had positive impact on language and the cognitive development of 
children older than two years living in rural areas. Similarly, an analysis of Paes de Barros et 
al., (2009) indicated that this program could increase kindergarten and crèche participation 
among the 1-6-year age group from 42.7% to 75.7%. The first six years of life are the most 
important in a person’s development process, so it was extremely appropriate for Chile Crece 
Contigo to provide children with universal access to basic services to ensure adequate 
development at the first stage of their life cycle, in which basic skills such as language, social 
ability, emotional control, and cognitive capabilities are acquired. 
Armecin et al., (2006) studied the five-year Early Childhood Development (ECD) 
project by government of the Philippines in 1999, whose overarching goal was to improve the 
survival and developmental potential of children, particularly those who are most vulnerable 
and disadvantaged. Using various targeted indicators of the project, the authors found that the 
ECD had positive contributions to participating children’s cognitive, language and socio-
emotional skills along with the other beneficiary impacts. 
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In regard to the impact of cash transfer programs on children’s school enrolments and/or 
attendance, Smulders and van Ours (2010) updated the work of Bourguignon et al., (2002) 
with the combined data from the 2009 PNAD and those from the Bolsa Família, and they 
found similar results. In particular, the results indicated that the program had a significant 
positive effect the enrolment rates and a sensible reduction in child labor due to two 
distinctive effects, namely the enrolment effect (which incentivizes parents to enroll their 
children at younger ages than they would normally do in order to become eligible to the 
transfer and the latter the effect of delaying the exit of children from school to the labor 
market at older ages, which indicates that the latest age extensions of the program have been 
successful in increasing the number of years of schooling per child) and the holding effect 
(which goes in support of the recent addition of 16 and 17 year olds into the program). More 
importantly, the authors argued that although Bolsa Família indeed helped increase education 
for children among poor families, it should not be seen as the main policy to improve human 
capital in the long run. 
A research by Meza‐Cordero (2011) on the Avancemos – a Costa Rica’s nationwide 
CCT program, which was introduced in 2006 aiming to give students’ parents a monthly 
subsidy, conditional on mandatory school attendance for each child. The program was 
introduced prioritizing those children in greater danger of dropping out of school. The author 
used the Costa Rican Household Survey in 2007 and 2010 with the Propensity Score 
Matching (PSM) technique to generate a control group based on observable characteristics in 
order to compare with the treatment group (i.e., those individuals who reveal receiving the 
subsidy). The estimates indicated that the program could increase the beneficiaries’ number of 
years of schooling by almost half a year, in which boys and urban children would benefit a 
little more than girls and rural children (0.685 and 0.707 year vs. 0.321 and 0.414 year, 
respectively).   
Son and Frolentino (2008) applied the Becker–Mincer human capital model with a 
multinomial logit model using the data from the Philippines’ Annual Poverty Indicator Survey 
(APIS) in 2004. Their analysis was based on three different choices made for children 
including ‘not attending school’, ‘attending school and also working outside the household’ 
and ‘attending school but not working outside the household’. They found that the transfer of 
PhP 300 per child per month could reduce the proportion of children not going to school in all 
households from 5.81% to 1.56%, while the impact on children studying and working was 
relative small and about 6.8% of these children could select to study only after abandoning 
their work in the labor market. They also suggested that the proportion of children not 
attending school in poor households was 9.37% instead of 5.81% in all households. More 
importantly, a 6.7-percent increase of school attendance among the poor showed that the CCT 
would be more effective in increasing school attendance for children in poor households than 
in all households. 
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Regarding the case of Sri Lanka, Kurama and Pfau (2010) showed positive and 
significant impact of per-capita expenditure (PCE) on school attendance at both primary and 
secondary levels. The authors indicated that cash transfer programs increasing households 
PCE was likely to increase the school participation at all levels.  
Meng and Pfau (2010) explored the case of Cambodia by applying a probit model to 
study the determinants of school attendance for children aged between 6 and 17 years old. 
They found that even a small benefit could impact positively on school attendance. 
Nevertheless, the impact would vary with benefit level and age range: for instance, the poor 
children who were provided a transfer equivalent to 26 percent of the poverty line with an 
ending eligible age of 15 would have the highest poverty reduction, while provided a benefit 
equivalent to 22% of the poverty line with an ending eligible age of 17 would achieve the 
highest increase in school attendance. 
Soares et al., (2008), with the data from Paraguay’s Household Survey in 2007, found 
that the increase of school attendance rate in both primary and secondary levels was higher 
among boys (i.e., between 6% and 11%) and among older children (aged 11 to 15 years) (i.e., 
between 9% and 15%). The larger impact of two subjects showed that the program could have 
not only dispirited dropping out but also brought children, who had previously dropped out, 
back to school. Older students, mainly boys, tended to drop out in order to work. They also 
argued that it was very difficult to have a significant impact of the program on the group aged 
6 to 9 years because of their already high attendance rate. 
Focusing on the Asignaciones Familiares – an Uruguayan child allowances program – 
Amarante et al., (2009) used ex-ante approach to evaluate impact of the program on 
teenager’s school attendance. They found that teenage attendance rates might be increased 
between 6 and 8 percentage points, and school attendance showed a progressive pattern. In 
particular, simulations with three cases combining work and school attendance (i.e., only 
study; study and work; and work only) showed that around 28.5 % of the children who were 
out of the educational system would return to study, in which the proportion was higher for 
girls (34.9%) than for boys (23.7%), and combination of work and study would maximize rate 
of movement from not attending to attending or attending and working.   
For the case of Fiji, UNICEF Pacific and Fiji Ministry of Women, Children and Poverty 
Alleviation (2015) showed that cash transfers – though small – could keep children in schools 
since such transfers could keep up school expenses and helped buy school uniform and 
clothes. 
Another important aspect of schooling is how cash transfer program could help children 
in transiting from lower to secondary schools. For Mexico, De Brauw and Hoddinott (2011) 
compared the impact of subsidy on school enrollment between households that received and 
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did not receive, and the results showed that the impact was higher among conditioned 
households, especially among children in the transition to lower secondary school.  As cited 
in Ferrando (n.d.), evaluations for Ecuador by Schady and Araujo (2008) and for Cambodia 
by Fiszbein and Schady (2009) showed that the largest effect on school outcomes are among 
children making the transition form primary to secondary school. In his own research, 
Ferrando (n.d.) also found that the conditional cash transfer (CCT) in Uruguay, i.e., Plan de 
Atencíon Nacional a la Emergencia Social (PANES), also helped to promote transition from 
primary to secondary school, though it was previously acknowledge that the Uruguayan 
educational system faced difficulties to smooth children’s transitions in the pre-program time. 
Third, studies about the impact of cash transfer programs on health care access and 
health outcomes of children. Exploring Colombia’s Familias en Acción,2 Attanasio et al., 
(2005) found that among children 24-60 months, consumption of both animal source foods 
and vegetables increased considerably, with vegetable consumption up 0.91 to 1.23 days per 
week and chicken consumption up by 0.25 to 0.38 days per week. Also, participation in 
Familias en Acción could increase health care service utilization among beneficiaries: for 
example, attendance at growth and development check-ups by children below 24 months 
among children benefiting the CCT increased by 23-30 percentage points (from 40 percent), 
and for children 24-48 months of age, attendance increased by an estimated 33-50 percentage 
points (from 67 percent).  
In Nicaragua, the Red de Proteccion Social (RPS) provided support to education of 
children in rural households, as well as health and nutrition transfers directly to mothers’ of 
beneficiary households conditional on (i) bringing her children to scheduled preventive health 
checks, (ii) attending bimonthly health education workshops, and (iii) adequate weight gain 
for children. Conducting a randomized pilot evaluation of RPS with a sample consisting of 
576 households with children aged 0-3 who were eligible for the food security, health and 
nutrition component of the program, Thomas (2010) provided an ex-ante estimation of the 
program impact on accessing preventive care for children (i.e., taking children below 3 years 
to health checks and full coverage of vaccinations for children between 12-23 months). 
Comparing ex-ante estimates with those from census survey, the paper found that the outcome 
of health checks in the last six months for children below 3 years with one year of cash 
transfers resulting in a 0.22 increase as compared to a 0.24 increase in the experimental 
evaluation. In addition, the one year impact of on-time full coverage of vaccinations (FCV) 
for children between 12 and 23 months of age also showed a statistically significant 0.2 
increase in FCV, which perfectly predicted the results from the experimental evaluation. 
Interestingly, the paper found that the immunization outcome which in the RPS design was 
                                                          
2
 It was introduced in 2001 to assist poor families with children in both rural and urban areas. The program 
provides a nutritional subsidy of approximately $15 per month to beneficiary families with children under the 
age of six. The conditionalities attached to this transfer include participation in growth and development check-
ups by children under five and the maintenance of up-to-date vaccinations (Bassett, 2008). 
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not a pre-requisite for receiving the cash transfer. Thus, the author demonstrated that it might 
be possible to improve utilization of preventive services in low income households without 
implementing conditionalities on their usage. 
Using data from the district-level household survey in 2007–2008, Carvalho et al., 
(2014) evaluated the impact of India’s CCT, namely Janani Suraksha Yojana (JSY), on 
childhood immunizations, postpartum care, breastfeeding practices, and care-seeking 
behaviors. They applied a propensity score matching analysis with logistic regression to 
pursue the evaluation. Their findings showed that receipt of financial assistance from JSY led 
to an increase in immunization rates ranging from 3.1 percentage points for one dose of polio 
vaccine to 9.1 percentage points in the proportion of fully vaccinated children. In addition, the 
estimates indicated that JSY led to increased post-partum check-up rates and healthy early 
breastfeeding practices around the time of childbirth. No effect of JSY was found on 
exclusive breastfeeding practices and care-seeking behaviors.  
For Viet Nam, there have been a number of studies discussing about child poverty and 
its determinants, including the role of poverty reduction program participation. However, 
there are few studies to provide ex-ante simulation to measure impacts of cash transfer 
program on children’s poverty, education and health. For instance, UNICEF and EPRI (2011) 
discussed about poverty situation of children in Viet Nam using multi-indicator child poverty 
rates measured by data from MICS 2006 and VHLSS 2008, and then provided various choices 
for a cash transfer program to children, including options for beneficiaries, transfer level, 
targeting mechanism and conditionality.  
At the best of our knowledge, there have been no ex-ante simulation studies on the 
impact of cash transfer program on education and health in Viet Nam. Therefore, this paper 
will provide various estimates using the data of the Viet Nam Household Living Standard 
Survey (VHLSS) in 2010 and 2012 in order to see how a cash transfer program could 
influence on children’s poverty, school attendance, and health care access. It will also provide 
estimates of the future costs under different scenarios of the number of future beneficiaries 
(which are estimated from the population projections by GSO (2011) along with varied 
benefit levels.  
III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
1. Data 
To pursue the research objectives, we will use the Viet Nam Household Living Standard 
Surveys (VHLSS) in 2010 and 2012. They were two out of the seven household surveys in 
Viet Nam conducted by the General Statistics Office (GSO) since 1992.  
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The surveys were conducted at household level, but included a number of individual 
characteristics such as age, gender, relationship to the household head, marital status, work 
status, and highest educational attainment. Such data let us identify a child (aged 0-15) and a 
household with at least a child. These surveys were representative at national and regional 
level, as well as for urban and rural areas.   
At the household level, the surveys provided information on the sources of income, 
household expenditure, ownership of consumer durables, business and agricultural activities, 
poverty incidence, participation in poverty alleviation programs, social insurance, wealth, and 
housing conditions. In particular, school fee exemption and scholarship are known at 
individual level, so that we can identify to whom (child) in a household these benefits were 
provided. In regard to health care, VHLSS provides information about participation in health 
insurance scheme, type of health insurance, number of inpatience and outpatience treatments 
along with respective costs, and out-of-pocket payments for health care services.  
Nevertheless, the data had some critical limitations, especially in terms of poverty 
estimation. Most of the income sources were only identified at the household level, so it is not 
clear which member was the main source of household income. Similarly, expenditure was 
identified at household level and there were no equivalence scales for different household 
members, so we do not know who was spending, and can only identify expenditure per capita 
within the household. Wealth data were also available only at the household level, so it is 
difficult to analyze intra-household transfers.  
Table 1 provides information of sample size for children in VHLSS 2010 and 2012. 
Table 1. Number of sampled children in VHLSS 2010 & 2012, by age group 
Age group VHLSS 2010 VHLSS 2012 
0-5 (persons) 3,594 3,384 
6-10 (persons) 3,014 2,954 
11-15 (persons) 3,265 3,074 
Total child observations (unweighted) 9,873 9,412 
VHLSS total observations (unweighted) 37,012 36,655 
Children as % of total observations (%) 26.68 25.68 
Source: Own calculations, using VHLSS 2010 & 2012 
2. Methodology 
2.1. Simulating impact of cash transfers on an outcome of children  
To do this, we first estimate the impact of household income on the outcome or welfare 
of children (such as child poverty rate, child school attendance, and health care utilization 
rate). For simplicity, we assume that household income is increased by the amount of 
transfers provided for households (which is equal to the number of child beneficiaries times 
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the benefit level per child beneficiary). Then, we predict the increase in the outcome of 
children due to an increase in household incomes caused by the transfers.  More specifically, 
we will estimate the outcome equation of children as follows: 
         ,, =  + 
(,) + ,, +  + , + ,, ,           (1) 
Where:  
• ,, is a welfare indicator (such as school enrolment or out-of-pocket spending on 
education) of child i in household j in the year t; 
• 
(), is log of per capita income of household j; 
•  is a dummy variable for year t; and 
• , is the vector of explanatory variables (such as household size or share of 
children in household).  
• Unobserved variables are decomposed into time-invariant component, ,, and 
time-variant component, ,,.   
We will estimate model (1) using child fixed-effects regression and panel data from 
VHLSSs 2010 and 2012. The panel data is constructed for the households which did not 
receive any cash transfers for children in both 2010 and 2012. The fixed-effects regression 
can estimate the children’s fixed-effects, ,. As a result, it can mitigate the endogeneity bias 
caused by the time-invariant unobserved variables.  
For estimating (1), we assume that the studied households received cash transfers for 
their children in 2012 (though, as mentioned, they in fact did not receive any cash transfers in 
both 2010 and 2012). Suppose the transfer amount provided to each child i in household j in 
2012 is ,. If the number of children is nc and the total number of household members is nh, 
the per capita income of household is increased by  ( ⁄ ),. If all the transfers are used as 
household’s disposable income, the new per capita income of household is , +
( ⁄ ), .  
After the model (1) is estimated, we can predict the effect of transfers on the children’s 
outcome using the estimated parameter in model (1). More specifically, the effect of the 
transfers on the outcome of children i in year t is estimated as follows: 
∆",, = #
, + ( ⁄ ), − 
%,&'( =
(
 )*+,-./,01(+2 +3⁄ )45,/*+,-./,0 6,                                                                   (2) 
For interpretation, we will compute the percentage change in the outcome of child i due 
to the transfer amount , as: 
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 %∆",, = 100 ∆",, ∆",,: = 100 ∆",, (
 )*+,-./,01(+2 +3⁄ )45,/*+,-./,0 6: ,     (3) 
The effect of the cash transfer on a group of children is equal to the average of (3) 
across the number of children in this group. 
2.2. Simulating fiscal costs of a universal cash transfer program for the children  
To estimate fiscal costs of a universal cash transfer program for the Vietnamese 
children, we will use age as a key variable, meaning that we will set different minimum 
eligible ages for the cash transfer program regardless of the specific characteristics of the 
recipients. Total cost includes only costs for paying benefits, and excludes administrative 
costs. In detail, suppose that the number of eligible children accounts for e percent of the total 
population, and the benefit provided to each person is equal to b percent of GDP per capita. 
The total fiscal costs excluding administrative costs - as a percent of GDP - will be:  
   t=e*b               (4) 
This calculation implies that the benefit is not linked to the official poverty line, which 
grows with inflation rather than GDP. Also, an increased number of eligible child recipients 
or higher benefit levels means higher fiscal costs.  
For the eligible children, we will use the population projections by GSO (2011) for the 
estimated child population in the period 2014-2025. With these projections, child population 
can be disaggregated into different age groups and areas of living (i.e., urban vs. rural). Thus, 
we will be able to simulate the costs for cash transfers to children living in urban and rural 
areas along with 5 groups by age, including 0-3; 4-5; 6-10; 11-15 (as defined now) and 16-18 
(as proposed in the amendment of the Law on Child Care and Protection). 
2.3. Main assumptions for all calculations  
As we will use the VHLSSs 2010 and 2012 data to simulate a counterfactual situation in 
which the current cash transfer program for the children in Viet Nam would be expanded to 
various child groups as indicated above. There are three main assumptions for such simulation 
exercises. 
First, benefit levels are assumed at VND 70,000 per child per month (or VND 840,000 
per child per year or equivalent to 2.31% of GDP per capita in 2012) as in the baseline 
scenario,3 while at VND 140,000 per child per month (or VND 1,680,000 per child per year 
or equivalent to 4.62% of GDP per capita in 2012) as in the simulation scenario. 
                                                          
3
 As in the Joint Circular MOLISA-MOF-MOET 26/2014/TTLT-BLDTBXH-BTC-BGDDT, dated 22 
September 2014, children aged 0-3 living in poor households will be supported at this level for 9 out of 12 
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Second, we assume that only benefit levels and age thresholds would be changed to 
match given fiscal costs, while other factors will remain the same. For instance, provided with 
benefits, the child and their family members will not change behavior such as the supply of 
labor and consumption styles.  
Third, there will be no macroeconomic feedback due to the expansion of the cash 
transfer program, because the government needs to increase social expenditure for the 
program.  
2.4. Limitations of the study and further research directions 
There are some limitations of this research, which need to be improved whenever data 
and methods allow.  
First, many missing information about educational status (such as dropping out) or 
health status (for instance, nutrition and Body Mass Index - BMI) prevent us from calculating 
the real impact of cash transfer on education and health. Combination of household surveys 
with other nationally representative surveys (such as Population and Housing Census-PHC; 
Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey-MICS; and Demographic and Health Survey-DHS), or 
additional surveys for household surveys may be needed to mitigate these limitations.   
Second, behavioral changes could not take into account in this study, so that we could 
not identify the real magnitude of impacts. Also, we could not provide a feedback model to 
see how tax-base spending for the program would impact on tax revenue, which in turn 
provide sources for government to spend. 
Thirdly, although explained above, the study was not able to formulate scenarios per 
ethnic group or geographic location due to the limitation on the part of population projections 
that is not disaggregated by such parameters. As such, age is the main parameter applied in 
cost simulations. 
Last but not least, various factors related to parents’ background, living conditions, and 
impacts from other policies could not observed and integrated in the estimation models, so 
that the expected results will be static rather than dynamic. As said, additional surveys are 
needed to provide complementary information for the analysis in this research. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
months in a year. However, for simplicity, in our calculations, we will assume that eligible beneficiaries will be 
supported for the full year  
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IV. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
1. An Overview of Children’s Welfare via Data from VHLSS 2010 and 2012 
Up to date, there have been a number of policies and programs to provide cash to 
support children, especially those who are poor, disable, and vulnerable. Table A.1 in the 
Appendix provides a detailed matrix describing some key cash transfer policies and programs 
for Vietnamese children. In this part, we will provide the current welfare status for children by 
their individual and household characteristics, using data from VHLSSs 2010 and 2012. 
Welfare includes access to education, utilization of health care, having clean water, having 
cultural materials, and poverty status.  
Table 2 presents the percentage of children attending schools by age and various 
individual and household characteristics. Overtime, attendance rates of all groups of children 
increased, particularly it was almost universal for those aged 6-10. There were not much 
differences between groups by characteristics, but children who are boys, Kinh/Hoa, living in 
urban areas, and living in non-poor households had higher attendance rates than their 
counterparts. 
Table 2. Percentage of children attending schools, by age group and other characteristics 
Characteristics VHLSS 2010 VHLSS 2012 3-5 6-10 11-15 Total 3-5 6-10 11-15 Total 
Sex         
− Boys 62.0 97.8 85.3 83.9 67.7 97.9 87.0 86.3 
− Girls 61.4 97.6 90.4 86.1 68.8 97.3 90.0 87.5 
Ethnicity 
        
− Kinh/Hoa 63.6 98.3 90.1 86.6 68.8 98.0 90.7 88.0 
− Ethnic minorities 53.0 95.0 77.4 78.0 65.5 96.1 79.0 82.1 
Area 
        
− Urban 69.6 98.5 94.5 89.2 76.2 97.6 90.9 89.5 
− Rural 58.5 97.4 85.6 83.5 64.8 97.6 87.7 85.9 
Poverty status 
        
− Non-Poor 67.5 98.7 91.3 88.2 70.9 98.5 91.8 89.2 
− Poor 47.6 95.3 78.6 77.1 60.0 94.8 77.5 79.4 
Total 61.7 97.7 87.7 85.0 68.2 97.6 88.5 86.9 
Source: Own estimates, using VHLSS 2010 & 2012 
Table 3 shows percentage of children having tuition fee exemption by age group and 
various individual and household characteristics. Across age groups and characteristics, 
percentage of children receiving tuition fee exemption also increased. It is clear that more 
vulnerable groups of children (i.e., ethnic minorities, living in rural areas, and poor) had 
significantly higher proportions to receive exemption than did their counterparts.   
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Table 3. Percentage of children having tuition fee exemption,  
by age group and other characteristics 
Characteristics VHLSS 2010 VHLSS 2012 3-5 6-10 11-15 Total 3-5 6-10 11-15 Total 
Sex         
− Boys 27.2 93.2 28.2 54.0 38.6 97.0 37.0 61.9 
− Girls 20.2 92.1 29.6 53.6 38.4 97.9 34.7 59.8 
Ethnicity 
        
− Kinh/Hoa 15.0 91.4 19.9 47.5 28.7 97.0 26.8 54.8 
− Ethnic minorities 71.9 98.4 73.0 83.8 88.3 99.4 80.7 89.8 
Area 
        
− Urban 11.3 86.8 15.7 42.5 24.0 95.0 17.8 49.3 
− Rural 30.0 94.7 33.4 58.0 45.9 98.4 42.4 65.4 
Poverty status 
        
− Non-Poor 14.8 91.2 18.6 46.3 28.8 96.8 26.0 54.1 
− Poor 54.9 96.1 58.9 74.8 74.7 99.5 74.7 85.3 
Total 23.9 92.6 28.9 53.8 38.5 97.4 35.8 60.8 
Source: Own estimates, using VHLSS 2010 & 2012 
Table 4. Household spending per child on education  
Unit: VND 1,000/year in Jan 2012 price 
Characteristics VHLSS 2010 VHLSS 2012 3-5 6-10 11-15 Total 3-5 6-10 11-15 Total 
Sex 
        
− Boys 1495.9 1306.0 1988.4 1628.2 1687.2 1338.5 2314.5 1797.0 
− Girls 1726.3 1404.8 1851.5 1647.0 1774.0 1346.7 2067.2 1734.3 
Ethnicity 
− Kinh/Hoa 1848.7 1572.0 2178.7 1878.2 2011.7 1543.7 2475.7 2020.9 
− Ethnic minorities 294.6 396.4 651.8 485.2 296.6 434.3 770.7 545.3 
Area 
− Urban 2794.7 2713.2 3439.6 3021.6 2892.3 2228.8 3890.3 3021.3 
− Rural 1028.8 876.3 1395.3 1123.6 1144.4 998.0 1568.6 1265.9 
Poverty status 
− Non-Poor 1926.9 1697.1 2306.5 1999.2 2060.3 1594.8 2548.3 2084.8 
− Poor 502.9 510.9 791.9 624.1 504.6 502.1 762.0 603.2 
Total 1605.1 1355.0 1921.7 1637.4 1729.7 1342.4 2189.4 1766.2 
Source: Own estimates, using VHLSS 2010 & 2012 
Total spending on education (estimated using prices in January 2012) increased between 
2010 and 2012 (Table 4). There were not significant difference between boys and girls in this 
aspect, but 2-4 times higher spending on education between children who are Kinh/Hoa, 
living in urban and living in non-poor households and their counterparts.4   
                                                          
4
 It should be noted that poor children are provided school fee exemption, so that their households’ total 
spending might be less than those without any exemption. 
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Out of pocket payments5 for the former groups of children (i.e., those who are 
Kinh/Hoa, living in urban, and living in non-poor households) could be a reason for such 
differences presented in Table 5. This can be clearly illustrated in Table 5: there were no 
differences between boys and girls, while children who are Kinh/Hoa, living in urban areas, 
and living in non-poor households had about 2-4 times higher OOP spending on education 
than their counterparts.  
Table 5. Household OOP spending per child on education  
Unit: VND 1,000/year in Jan 2012 price 
Characteristics VHLSS 2010 VHLSS 2012 3-5 6-10 11-15 Total 3-5 6-10 11-15 Total 
Sex 
        
− Boys 641.0 1018.2 1458.5 1136.8 818.5 1130.4 1614.6 1266.6 
− Girls 660.4 1082.2 1505.0 1189.1 776.4 1103.7 1606.6 1257.2 
Ethnicity 
− Kinh/Hoa 738.8 1211.4 1670.8 1322.5 916.7 1284.0 1812.3 1434.6 
− Ethnic minorities 173.4 336.8 544.3 396.2 193.8 367.5 611.0 434.6 
Area 
− Urban 941.2 1889.8 2509.4 1939.7 1194.7 1772.8 2637.5 1981.6 
− Rural 509.2 753.9 1124.6 873.8 598.1 863.2 1235.7 975.2 
Poverty status 
− Non-Poor 765.6 1296.6 1768.2 1401.0 929.5 1320.7 1863.6 1476.1 
− Poor 255.0 441.3 638.5 493.8 310.3 441.7 604.3 480.3 
Total 650.2 1049.9 1481.2 1162.3 797.9 1117.7 1610.6 1262.0 
Note: OOP spending on education is calculated as total spending on education excludes tuition fees and school 
contribution. 
Source: Own estimates, using VHLSS 2010 & 2012 
In terms of health care, Table 6 presents the percentage of children having health 
insurance by age and other characteristics. It indicates that more children were covered by 
health insurance and about 90 percent of Vietnamese children had health insurance in 2012. 
There were no significant differences between more vulnerable groups (i.e., those who are 
ethnic minorities, living in rural areas, and living in poor households) and their counterparts in 
terms of health insurance coverage.    
 
  
                                                          
5
 OPP payments include such categories as contributions to school, parents’ fund, uniforms, and extra classes. 
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Table 6. Percentage of children having health insurance,  
by age group and other characteristics 
Characteristics VHLSS 2010 VHLSS 2012 0-5 6-10 11-15 Total 0-5 6-10 11-15 Total 
Sex 
        
− Boys 89.5 83.8 78.5 84.3 93.1 90.6 84.6 89.7 
− Girls 91.6 84.7 82.8 86.8 92.4 90.4 86.6 90.0 
Ethnicity 
        
− Kinh/Hoa 90.0 82.4 78.9 84.3 92.8 89.8 84.5 89.3 
− Ethnic minorities 92.9 92.1 87.5 90.8 92.9 93.7 90.4 92.3 
Area 
        
− Urban 89.4 88.7 88.1 88.8 90.7 93.4 88.3 90.8 
− Rural 91.0 82.7 78.2 84.3 93.6 89.4 84.6 89.5 
Poverty status 
        
− Non-Poor 90.1 83.0 80.3 84.9 93.1 90.9 85.3 89.9 
− Poor 91.7 87.3 81.2 87.1 91.9 89.2 86.4 89.4 
Total 90.5 84.3 80.5 85.5 92.8 90.5 85.6 89.8 
Source: Own estimates, using VHLSS 2010 & 2012 
Tables 7 and 8 present access of children at different ages and with various 
characteristics, who had at least an illness in the year, to inpatient and outpatient healthcare 
services, respectively.  
Table 7. Number of inpatience healthcare contacts per child in a year 
Characteristics VHLSS 2010 VHLSS 2012 0-5 6-10 11-15 Total 0-5 6-10 11-15 Total 
Sex         
− Boys 0.12 0.08 0.06 0.09 0.13 0.05 0.04 0.08 
− Girls 0.12 0.06 0.04 0.08 0.09 0.04 0.03 0.06 
Ethnicity         
− Kinh/Hoa 0.12 0.07 0.05 0.08 0.1 0.04 0.04 0.06 
− Ethnic minorities 0.13 0.07 0.05 0.09 0.15 0.08 0.04 0.09 
Area         
− Urban 0.10 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.03 0.04 0.06 
− Rural 0.13 0.08 0.05 0.09 0.12 0.05 0.04 0.07 
Poverty status         
− Non-Poor 0.14 0.07 0.06 0.09 0.11 0.05 0.04 0.07 
− Poor 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.11 0.05 0.02 0.07 
Total 0.12 0.07 0.05 0.08 0.11 0.05 0.04 0.07 




Table 8. Number of outpatient healthcare contacts per child in year 
Characteristics VHLSS 2010 VHLSS 2012 0-5 6-10 11-15 Total 0-5 6-10 11-15 Total 
Sex         
− Boys 2.32 1.06 0.6 1.41 1.83 0.92 0.61 1.18 
− Girls 1.83 1.06 0.6 1.21 1.65 0.88 0.56 1.08 
Ethnicity 
        
− Kinh/Hoa 2.30 1.15 0.64 1.44 1.9 0.98 0.65 1.24 
− Ethnic minorities 1.08 0.67 0.42 0.74 1.06 0.52 0.31 0.66 
Area 
        
− Urban 2.58 1.32 0.61 1.66 2.24 1 0.65 1.4 
− Rural 1.88 0.97 0.6 1.19 1.55 0.86 0.56 1.03 
Poverty status 
        
− Non-Poor 2.4 1.21 0.69 1.5 1.93 0.98 0.65 1.24 
− Poor 1.32 0.71 0.38 0.85 1.17 0.64 0.39 0.77 
Total 2.09 1.06 0.6 1.31 1.75 0.9 0.59 1.13 
Source: Own estimates, using VHLSS 2010 & 2012 
In terms of inpatient healthcare services, Table 7 shows that there were no differences 
between groups of children across the ages and characteristics. In contrast, Table 8 show that 
children who were Kinh/Hoa, living in urban areas, and living in non-poor households had 
significantly higher rates of access to outpatient healthcare services than did their 
counterparts. Among various explanations for such differences, farther distance to the nearest 
healthcare centers and heavier burden of out-of-pocket payments for healthcare services were 
the most important (Nguyen et al., 2015; Giang & Bui, 2013). 
In regard to safe drinking water,6 Table 9 presents the percentage of children – at 
different age groups and with different characteristics – living in households with these 
sources. The results show that higher percentage of children had safe drinking water sources 
overtime. There was no difference between boys and girls in this regard. However, children 
who were Kinh/Hoa, living in urban areas, and living in non-poor households had about 10-30 
percentage point higher than did their counterparts in having safe drinking water. Difference 
in infrastructure development between the former and the latter could be a cause of this.   
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Table 9. Percentage of children living in households having safe drinking water 
Characteristics VHLSS 2010 VHLSS 2012 0-5 6-10 11-15 Total 0-5 6-10 11-15 Total 
Sex         
− Boys 87.4 88.4 87.2 87.6 88.7 89.2 89.3 89.1 
− Girls 89.3 87.6 88.4 88.5 89.1 91.2 89.7 89.9 
Ethnicity         
− Kinh/Hoa 93.1 92.6 92.0 92.6 94.0 94.6 93.4 94.0 
− Ethnic minorities 66.1 68.3 69.8 68.0 65.7 70.5 73.0 69.5 
Area         
− Urban 97.4 96.4 97.7 97.2 96.8 97.5 97.7 97.3 
− Rural 84.5 85.0 84.7 84.7 85.8 87.3 86.6 86.5 
Poverty status         
− Non-Poor 93.6 93.2 91.9 92.9 94.6 95.5 94.4 94.8 
− Poor 75.3 75.5 77.4 76.0 70.9 73.2 73.3 72.3 
Total 88.3 88.0 87.8 88.1 88.9 90.2 89.5 89.5 
Source: Own estimates, using VHLSS 2010 & 2012 
Similar findings could be observed in Table 10, which presents the percentage of 
children living in households with hygienic latrine.7 Again, there was no difference between 
boys and girls at all ages. Conversely, more vulnerable groups of children (i.e., those who 
were ethnic minorities, living in rural areas, and living in poor households) had significantly 
lower rates of having hygienic latrine than did their counterparts who were Kinh/Hoa, living 
in urban areas, and living in non-poor households. Such huge differences might indicate that 
more vulnerable children were more vulnerable to health issues resulted from lack of hygienic 
latrine.   
Table 10. Percentage of children living in households with hygienic latrine 
Characteristics VHLSS 2010 VHLSS 2012 0-5 6-10 11-15 Total 0-5 6-10 11-15 Total 
Sex         
− Boys 64.3 61.5 65.2 63.8 69.3 67.5 67.7 68.3 
− Girls 65.0 63.3 62.9 63.8 66.3 67.5 65.4 66.4 
Ethnicity         
− Kinh/Hoa 75.3 72.9 74.8 74.5 79.2 78.5 76.6 78.1 
− Ethnic minorities 14.9 17.4 19.1 17.0 16.1 19.1 23.5 19.4 
Area         
− Urban 90.9 88.8 89.1 89.8 91.3 89.7 91.3 90.8 
− Rural 53.7 53.2 56.3 54.4 58.4 58.9 57.9 58.4 
Poverty status         
− Non-Poor 78.8 76.2 77.0 77.5 82.2 79.9 77.7 80.1 
− Poor 29.9 29.4 31.6 30.3 22.7 27.7 29.4 26.3 
Total 64.6 62.4 64.1 63.8 67.8 67.5 66.6 67.3 
Source: Own estimates, using VHLSS 2010 & 2012 
                                                          
7
 Hygienic latrine includes septic/semi-septic tank; suilabh; double septic tank. 
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In terms of reading materials – measured by the number of comic books per child – 
Table 11 also indicates that more vulnerable groups of children had significantly lower 
number of comic per child than did their less vulnerable counterparts.    
Table 11. Number of comic books per child 
Characteristics VHLSS 2010 VHLSS 2012 0-5 6-10 11-15 Total 0-5 6-10 11-15 Total 
Sex         
− Boys 2.75 3.66 3.31 3.19 2.89 3.86 3.48 3.36 
− Girls 2.51 3.84 3.32 3.16 3.01 4.13 3.86 3.60 
Ethnicity         
− Kinh/Hoa 3.03 4.33 3.83 3.65 3.42 4.64 4.17 4.01 
− Ethnic minorities 0.83 1.26 1.12 1.05 0.81 1.11 1.53 1.13 
Area         
− Urban 4.21 6.17 5.55 5.14 4.65 6.19 5.33 5.30 
− Rural 1.99 2.90 2.62 2.46 2.27 3.14 3.09 2.78 
Poverty status         
− Non-Poor 3.30 4.69 4.11 3.95 3.56 4.83 4.32 4.17 
− Poor 1.02 1.49 1.31 1.25 1.03 1.30 1.50 1.25 
Total 2.64 3.75 3.32 3.17 2.95 3.99 3.67 3.48 
Source: Own estimates, using VHLSS 2010 & 2012 
Table 12 presents poverty rates of children at different age groups with different 
characteristics. In this table, poverty rates are calculated using real per capita expenditure 
(using the price of January in each survey year).  
Table 12. Child poverty rate (%) 
Characteristics VHLSS 2010 VHLSS 2012 0-5 6-10 11-15 Total 0-5 6-10 11-15 Total 
Sex         
− Boys 28.6 29.5 26.6 28.2 23.8 23.2 22.6 23.2 
− Girls 29.4 29.6 30.3 29.8 24.4 24.5 23.4 24.1 
Ethnicity         
− Kinh/Hoa 18.4 18.5 18.0 18.3 13.5 13.0 13.2 13.2 
− Ethnic minorities 77.9 76.8 72.5 75.8 72.6 71.6 65.1 69.8 
Area         
− Urban 9.0 7.8 9.4 8.8 7.3 9.5 9.1 8.4 
− Rural 37.3 37.2 34.3 36.2 30.9 29.3 27.8 29.4 
Total 29.0 29.6 28.4 29.0 24.1 23.8 23.0 23.6 
Source: Own estimates, using VHLSS 2010 & 2012 
The overall poverty rate of all children reduced from 29% in 2010 to 23.6% in 2012, 
and poverty reductions occurred at all ages overtime. In terms of sex, there were no 
significant differences in poverty rates between boys and girls across overtime, though girls 
always had slightly higher rates of poverty than did boys across all age groups. 
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At all age groups, there were substantial differences in poverty rates between Kinh/Hoa 
and urban children and their counterparts, in which the former’s poverty rates were about one-
fifth to one-fourth of the latter’s. More importantly, the rates of reduction for the former 
groups were faster than those of the latter groups, meaning that there were widening gaps in 
poverty rates between these groups of children. 
2. Simulating the Impacts of Cash Transfers on Children’s Welfare 
As discussed in the methodology, the first step in simulating the impacts of cash 
transfers on children’s welfare is to run a regression of children’s outcomes using household’s 
per capita income in 2012. In the regression, we will use a small set of control variables which 
are more exogenous and not affected by the income variable (see, for instance, Heckman et 
al., 1999). Time-invariant variables, such as gender of children and parental characteristics, 
are controlled by fixed-effects regressions. Using the estimates of coefficients of logarithm of 
income per capita and formulas (2) and (3), we could predict the effect of cash transfers on 
the outcomes of children. We will predict the effect of income on only outcome variables that 
are significantly affected by income.     
In the next step, we will present the prediction of the two levels of cash transfers on 
each outcome of children for different groups of children. The cash transfer levels are VND 
70,000/child/month and VND 140,000/child/month. It should be noted that, in all regressions, 
we deflate the income variable and other monetary variables to the January 2012 price.  
2.1. Impact on children’s education 
Table 13 presents the regression of education outcomes of children on logarithm of per 
capita income. There was a positive effect of income on school enrolment in both primary and 
secondary levels (i.e., for those aged 6-10 and 11-15). Since the income variable is measure in 
log, the estimate ‘0.0394’ means that a one percent increase in per capita income could lead to 
a 0.0394 percent increase in the probability of children’s school enrolment.  
There were no significant effects of income on the probability of receiving tuition 
exemption or reduction. The sign of income variable is even negative. It is expected, since 
tuition exemption and reduction was applied only for primary students, and mainly for poor 
and ethnic minority students.  
Income could significantly increase out-of-pocket spending on education. More 
specially, a one percent increase in per capita income could help households increase ‘out-of-
pocket spending on education’ and ‘out-of-pocket spending on education excluding tuition 




Table 13. Child fixed-effects regressions of education outcomes 




















Log of per capita income 0.0394*** -0.0292 0.8827*** 0.4538*** 
(0.013) (0.024) (0.278) (0.149) 
Household size 0.0150* 0.0273** 0.0695 0.0400 
(0.008) (0.013) (0.083) (0.041) 
Proportion of children in household 0.5060*** 0.1784* -1.7755*** -0.2116 
(0.057) (0.093) (0.659) (0.416) 
Proportion of elderly in household -0.0886 0.0022 -0.1520 -0.1084 
(0.113) (0.234) (0.585) (0.476) 
Year 2012 dummy 0.0492*** 0.0427*** 0.2209** 0.2929*** 
(0.007) (0.014) (0.103) (0.064) 
Constant 0.1929 0.6388** -6.4995** -3.4243** 
(0.139) (0.250) (2.741) (1.453) 
Observations 6,507 5,592 5,592 5,592 
R-squared 0.037 0.007 0.0414 0.042 
Number of children 3,463 3,138 3,138 3,138 
     
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses;  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Own estimates, using VHLSS 2012 
Table 14 provides the predicted (simulated) impact of cash transfers on school 
enrolment of children at different ages. 
Table 14. Simulated impact of transfer on school enrolment (in percent) 
Group 
Scenario 1: Transfer amount of  
VND 70,000/month/child 
Scenario 2: Transfer amount of  
VND 140,000/month/child 
3-5 6-10 11-15 Total 3-5 6-10 11-15 Total 
Gender 
        
− Boys 0.155 0.118 0.121 0.126 0.294 0.223 0.232 0.239 
− Girls 0.152 0.111 0.125 0.125 0.290 0.210 0.240 0.237 
Ethnicity 
        
− Kinh/Hoa 0.061 0.041 0.049 0.048 0.117 0.077 0.093 0.091 
− Ethnic 
minorities 0.583 0.388 0.435 0.439 1.108 0.736 0.826 0.836 
Rural/urban 
        
− Urban 0.017 0.030 0.030 0.025 0.032 0.057 0.058 0.048 
− Rural 0.214 0.139 0.150 0.158 0.408 0.264 0.285 0.299 
Poverty 
        
− Non-Poor 0.023 0.023 0.026 0.023 0.045 0.046 0.050 0.046 
− Poor 0.611 0.413 0.475 0.473 1.162 0.783 0.901 0.897 
Total 0.154 0.114 0.124 0.125 0.293 0.217 0.236 0.238 
Source: Own estimates, using VHLSS 2012 
Table 14 shows that the transfer amount of VND 70,000/month/child could increase the 
school enrolment rate of children by 0.125 percent. Since the regression model is linear, the 
effect of transfer benefit at VND 140,000/month/child could be around twice the effect of 
VND 70,000/month/child. The effect could be small as the assumed transfer amount is small. 
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In addition, income is just one factor determining the school enrolment. Money is fungible, 
and households could use the received cash for not only children but also for spending on 
common household consumption.  
The effect could be higher for ethnic minorities and poor students, since these students 
are the main recipients of cash transfers. The effect on the kindergarten and lower-secondary 
school enrolment could be higher than the effect on the primary school enrolment, since the 
rate of primary school enrolment was much higher than rate of schooling for kindergarten and 
lower-secondary school. 
Table 15 and Table 16 show how cash transfers could increase out-of-pocket spending 
on education. In total, the transfer amount of VND 70,000/month/child could increase out-of-
pocket spending on education per student by 1.4 percent. Such an effect on poor and ethnic 
minority students was around 15 percent.  
Table 15. Predicted impact of transfer on households’  
out-of-pocket spending per student on education (in percent) 
Group 
Scenario 1: Transfer amount of  
VND 70,000/month/child 
Scenario 2: Transfer amount of  
VND 140,000/month/child 
3-5 6-10 11-15 Total 3-5 6-10 11-15 Total 
Gender 
        
− Boys 1.307 2.133 0.963 1.319 2.490 4.053 1.835 2.511 
− Girls 1.334 1.754 1.351 1.475 2.537 3.328 2.570 2.804 
Ethnicity         
− Kinh/Hoa 0.457 0.584 0.392 0.462 0.872 1.110 0.748 0.881 
− Ethnic 
minorities 27.57 18.36 10.85 15.09 52.40 34.84 20.62 28.66 
Rural/urban         
− Urban 0.091 0.278 0.152 0.159 0.174 0.532 0.293 0.305 
− Rural 2.593 3.101 1.781 2.328 4.934 5.887 3.388 4.424 
Poverty         
− Non-Poor 0.174 0.334 0.202 0.227 0.336 0.645 0.391 0.438 
− Poor 15.61 18.76 11.69 14.55 29.66 35.51 22.19 27.59 
Total 1.320 1.933 1.128 1.393 2.513 3.671 2.147 2.649 
Note: OOP spending on education is calculated as total spending on education excludes tuition fees and school 
contribution. 




Table 16. Predicted impact of transfer on households’ out-of-pocket spending  
per student on education (in percent) 
Group 
Scenario 1: Transfer amount of  
VND 70,000/month/child 
Scenario 2: Transfer amount of  
VND 140,000/month/child 
3-5 6-10 11-15 Total 3-5 6-10 11-15 Total 
Gender 
        
− Boys 1.370 1.257 0.785 1.013 2.608 2.390 1.496 1.927 
− Girls 1.643 1.086 0.859 1.035 3.124 2.062 1.634 1.967 
Ethnicity         
− Kinh/Hoa 0.527 0.353 0.288 0.343 1.006 0.672 0.549 0.654 
− Ethnic 
minorities 20.99 11.07 6.99 9.63 39.89 21.02 13.30 18.29 
Rural/urban         
− Urban 0.108 0.169 0.129 0.129 0.207 0.325 0.249 0.248 
− Rural 2.806 1.864 1.180 1.593 5.339 3.538 2.244 3.027 
Poverty         
− Non-Poor 0.203 0.203 0.149 0.169 0.392 0.391 0.287 0.326 
− Poor 12.71 10.96 7.56 9.39 24.16 20.75 14.34 17.82 
Total 1.501 1.169 0.821 1.023 2.856 2.220 1.562 1.947 
Note: OOP spending on education is calculated as total spending on education excludes tuition fees and school 
contribution. 
Source: Own estimates, using VHLSS 2012 
2.2. Impact on children’s health utilization and spending 
Table 17 presents the child-effects regressions of health outcomes on income and 
household-level variables. As can be seen, there were no significant effects of cash transfer on 
healthcare contacts (both inpatience and outpatience) and out-of-pocket spending on 
healthcare. We tried other specifications of health care models (such as log of out-of-pocket 
spending or total out-of-pocket spending rather than out-of-pocket spending per healthcare 
contact) but we could not find any significant effect of log of per capita income in these 
specifications. There was a significant effect of income on the probability of having health 
insurance: a one percent increase in per capita income leads to a 0.033 percent increase in the 





Table 17. Child fixed-effects regressions of health outcomes 

































Log of per capita income 0.0333** -0.0091 0.0210 0.0241 0.2742 
 
(0.014) (0.113) (0.030) (0.016) (1.197) 
Having health insurance 
(yes=1; no=0)  0.3208** 0.0145 0.0090 0.3380 
  (0.156) (0.025) (0.019) (2.198) 
Household size 0.0111 -0.0547 -0.0308 0.0039 0.1187 
 
(0.008) (0.048) (0.025) (0.008) (0.447) 
Proportion of children in 
household 0.0800 -0.7462* -0.0697 -0.1197** -0.7598 
 
(0.063) (0.381) (0.207) (0.056) (7.431) 
Proportion of elderly in 
household 0.0331 -1.0149 -0.2224 0.0125 -3.6386 
 
(0.125) (0.865) (0.383) (0.111) (5.756) 




(0.007) (0.060) (0.029) (0.010) (1.069) 
Constant 0.4545*** 1.7478 0.1030 -0.1286 -1.7866 
 
(0.148) (1.196) (0.222) (0.170) (6.515) 
Observations 7,624 7,624 2,829 7,624 406 
R-squared 0.008 0.0127 0.007 0.003 0.033 
Number of children 3,812 3,812 2,054 3,812 378 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses;  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Own estimates, using VHLSS 2012 
More money could improve the rate of having health insurance (Table 18). The transfer 
amount of VND 70,000/month/child could increase the proportion of having health insurance 
among children aged 6-10 and 11-15 by 0.105 percent and 0.109 percent, respectively. For the 
transfer amount of VND 140,000/month/child, the estimated results are 0.199 percent and 
0.207 percent, respectively. This small effect is expected, since cash transfers could be used 
mainly in spending on education and common consumption of households. As a result, a 




Table 18. Simulated impact of cash transfer on having health insurance (in percent) 
Group 
Scenario 1: Transfer amount of  
VND 70,000/month/child 
Scenario 2: Transfer amount of  
VND 140,000/month/child 
6-10 11-15 6-10 11-15 
Gender 
    
− Boys 0.109 0.107 0.207 0.203 
− Girls 0.100 0.112 0.190 0.212 
Ethnicity     
− Kinh/Hoa 0.038 0.045 0.071 0.085 
− Ethnic minorities 0.341 0.332 0.646 0.632 
Rural/urban     
− Urban 0.026 0.026 0.050 0.050 
− Rural 0.129 0.132 0.245 0.252 
Poverty     
− Non-Poor 0.021 0.024 0.042 0.045 
− Poor 0.377 0.367 0.714 0.696 
Total 0.105 0.109 0.199 0.207 
Source: Own estimates, using VHLSS 2010 & 2012 
3.3. Impact on children’s poverty rate 
Similar to the regressions for education and health, we regressed the expenditure-based 
poverty rate on income and other control variables, and the results show that increasing 
income by one percent would reduce the probability of being poor by 0.1419 percent.  
Table 19 presents the simulated impact of cash transfer on the probability of being poor 
for children. The results show that the transfers of VND 70,000 /month/child could reduce the 
expenditure-based poverty rate of children by 1.624 percent, while it could reduce 3 percent 
with the transfers of VND 140,000/month/child.  
Table 19. Simulated impact of transfer on the probability of being poor 
Group 
Scenario 1: Transfer amount of  
VND 70,000/month/child 
Scenario 2: Transfer amount of  
VND 140,000/month/child 
0-5 6-10 11-15 Total 0-5 6-10 11-15 Total 
Gender 
        
− Boys -1.530 -1.708 -1.621 -1.621 -2.914 -3.242 -3.091 -3.085 
− Girls -1.489 -1.705 -1.689 -1.626 -2.831 -3.237 -3.214 -3.090 
Ethnicity         
− Kinh -1.113 -1.190 -1.201 -1.170 -2.133 -2.263 -2.289 -2.227 
− Ethnic minorities -1.820 -2.048 -2.013 -1.964 -3.460 -3.888 -3.825 -3.730 
Rural/urban         
− Urban -1.169 -1.457 -1.394 -1.373 -2.262 -2.788 -2.692 -2.631 
− Rural -1.522 -1.724 -1.671 -1.640 -2.897 -3.272 -3.179 -3.117 
Poverty         
− Non-Poor n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 
− Poor -1.330 -1.437 -1.388 -1.385 -2.527 -2.721 -2.634 -2.627 
Total -1.508 -1.706 -1.656 -1.624 -2.871 -3.238 -3.150 -3.088 




2.3. Impact on other welfare of children 
In Table 20, we examine the effect of income on several welfare outcomes, including 
having at least a comic book, the number of comic books,  living in house with clean drinking 
water, living in house with hygienic latrine, and expenditure-based poverty status.  



























Log of per capita income 0.0917*** 0.9048*** 0.0099 0.0439*** -0.1419*** 
 
(0.021) (0.169) (0.011) (0.013) (0.017) 
Household size 0.0077 0.0649 -0.0087 -0.0106* 0.0327*** 
 
(0.013) (0.111) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) 
Proportion of children in 
household 0.4594*** 4.0451*** 0.0254 -0.0404 -0.0016 
 
(0.089) (0.731) (0.045) (0.052) (0.062) 
Proportion of elderly in 
household -0.0621 0.0988 -0.2453** -0.1625* 0.1907 
 
(0.189) (1.525) (0.108) (0.089) (0.145) 
Year 2012 dummy 0.0617*** 0.5033*** 0.0201*** 0.0354*** -0.0568*** 
 
(0.011) (0.087) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
Constant -0.6674*** -7.5091*** 0.8274*** 0.2701** 1.4975*** 
 
(0.221) (1.812) (0.115) (0.133) (0.177) 
Observations 7,624 7,624 7,624 7,624 7,624 
R-squared 0.023 0.029 0.006 0.0181 0.070 
Number of children 3,812 3,812 3,812 3,812 3,812 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses;  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Own estimates, using VHLSS 2012 
It is indicated that children living in households with higher income were more likely to 
have comic books. More specifically, a one percent increase in per capita income could raise 
the probability of having comic book by 0.0917 percent, and the number of comic books by 
0.9048 percent.  
The effect of income on the clean drinking water is small and not significant. A reason 
might be that low income households can still have access to clean drinking water sources 
such as rain water or protected well.  However, increased income helps better access to 
hygienic latrines. A one percent increase in per capita income leads to a 0.0439 percent 
increase in the probability of having hygienic latrine. 
Table 21 and Table 22 present the impact of transfers on the probability of having 
comic book and the number of comic books. The transfers of VND 70,000/month/child could 
increase the proportion of having comic book among children by 0.516 percent, and the 
number of comic books by 0.7 percent. The figures for the transfers of VND 
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140,000/month/child could be 0.981 percent and 1.332 percent, respectively. In both 
scenarios, the effect could be much larger for poor children as well as ethnic minority children 
than other groups of children based on the estimated coefficients – which is a good sign for 
promoting cash transfer program for these groups of children.  
Table 21. Simulated impact of transfer on the probability of having comic book (in percent) 
Group 
Scenario 1: Transfer amount of  
VND 70,000/month/child 
Scenario 2: Transfer amount of  
VND 140,000/month/child 
0-5 6-10 11-15 Total 0-5 6-10 11-15 Total 
Gender 
        
− Boys 0.534 0.515 0.528 0.524 1.016 0.979 1.006 0.998 
− Girls 0.531 0.469 0.521 0.508 1.010 0.891 0.993 0.963 
Ethnicity         
− Kinh/Hoa 0.187 0.152 0.190 0.175 0.357 0.290 0.361 0.337 
− Ethnic minorities 5.426 3.482 2.977 3.636 10.303 6.610 5.657 6.906 
Rural/urban         
− Urban 0.045 0.089 0.097 0.076 0.088 0.170 0.187 0.147 
− Rural 0.847 0.689 0.694 0.733 1.613 1.310 1.318 1.392 
Poverty         
− Non-Poor 0.069 0.088 0.098 0.086 0.135 0.169 0.190 0.166 
− Poor 4.521 3.644 3.220 3.690 8.590 6.899 6.113 7.000 
Total 0.532 0.493 0.525 0.516 1.014 0.935 0.999 0.981 
Source: Own estimates, using VHLSS 2012 
Table 22. Simulated impact of transfer on the number of comic books (in percent) 
Group 
Scenario 1: Transfer amount of  
VND 70,000/month/child 
Scenario 2: Transfer amount of  
VND 140,000/month/child 
0-5 6-10 11-15 Total 0-5 6-10 11-15 Total 
Gender 
        
− Boys 0.746 0.708 0.708 0.719 1.420 1.346 1.349 1.368 
− Girls 0.713 0.640 0.697 0.682 1.355 1.215 1.325 1.297 
Ethnicity         
− Kinh 0.251 0.202 0.248 0.233 0.480 0.384 0.472 0.444 
− Ethnic minorities 10.11 6.87 4.89 6.51 19.21 13.03 9.29 12.38 
Rural/urban         
− Urban 0.056 0.110 0.112 0.092 0.107 0.212 0.216 0.178 
− Rural 1.249 0.993 0.989 1.058 2.376 1.886 1.880 2.010 
Poverty         
− Non-Poor 0.092 0.114 0.127 0.112 0.178 0.221 0.245 0.217 
− Poor 9.21 7.49 5.63 7.05 17.50 14.18 10.68 13.37 
Total 0.728 0.674 0.703 0.700 1.386 1.280 1.337 1.332 
Source: Own estimates, using VHLSS 2010 & 2012 
In Table 23, we simulate the effect of cash transfers on the probability of having 
hygienic latrine. The transfers of VND 70,000/month/child could also increase the proportion 
of having hygienic latrine by 0.19 percent. For the transfers of VND 140,000/month/child, the 





Table 23. Simulated impact of transfer on the probability of having hygienic latrine  
(in percent) 
Group 
Scenario 1: Transfer amount of  
VND 70,000/month/child 
Scenario 2: Transfer amount of  
VND 140,000/month/child 
0-5 6-10 11-15 Total 0-5 6-10 11-15 Total 
Gender 
        
− Boys 0.173 0.202 0.185 0.185 0.329 0.383 0.351 0.354 
− Girls 0.187 0.187 0.204 0.193 0.354 0.355 0.387 0.366 
Ethnicity         
− Kinh 0.061 0.058 0.066 0.062 0.118 0.110 0.125 0.118 
− Ethnic 
minorities 2.763 2.128 2.133 2.286 5.255 4.042 4.053 4.338 
Rural/urban         
− Urban 0.015 0.037 0.035 0.028 0.030 0.069 0.066 0.053 
− Rural 0.287 0.268 0.259 0.269 0.546 0.510 0.493 0.514 
Poverty         
− Non-Poor 0.024 0.034 0.034 0.031 0.045 0.065 0.067 0.059 
− Poor 1.683 1.981 1.620 1.744 3.198 3.752 3.073 3.308 
Total 0.179 0.195 0.194 0.190 0.342 0.369 0.368 0.360 
Source: Own estimates, using VHLSS 2012 
3. Reaching Age-based Universal Scheme - Cost Simulations 
In this section, we will estimate the costs for having universal schemes for children at 
different age groups and areas of living in the period 2014-2025, using the the population 
projections in the period 2009-2049 by GSO (2011). To estimate respective costs, we will use 
formula (4). Using VND 70,000/month/child transferred to children in 2012 as benchmark for 
benefit level, we will be able to calculate costs for each group and all child population in 
2015-2025 period. Although benefit is fixed at 2.31% of GDP per capita, benefit level in the 
future will also increase as long as GDP per capita is improved.8 
Figure 1 presents the projected populations by age group in the period 2009-2025 for 
the whole Vietnam. As a percent of the total population, child population (0-15) will decrease 
overtime, working-age population (16-64) will increase slightly and then decrease, while old-
age population (65 and over) will significantly increase. Such demographic trends show that 
the number of potential child beneficiaries for the cash transfer program will decrease 
overtime, even for the universal scheme to cover all children. 
In specific, Figure 2 shows the projected child populations by age group and areas of 
living in absolute number (upper panel) and relative number (lower panel). 
  
                                                          
8
 In 2012, GDP per capita was about VND 36,355,915/person. As such, VND 70,000/month (or VND 
840,000/year) is equal to 0.0023% of GDP per capita.  
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Figure 1. Projected population of Viet Nam by age group, 2009-2049   
 
Source: Own compilation, using GSO (2011) 
Figure 2. Projected child population by age group and areas of living, 2014-2025    
 























Child population - Number distribution by age and area, 2014-2025




Table 24 shows the cost estimates for each group of children and for all children along 
with their areas of living in the 2014-2025 period. The detailed estimates are presented in 
Table A.2 in the Appendix. 
As shown, the total cost for covering all children (aged 0-15) with the same benefit at 
2.31% GDP per capital will slightly decrease from 0.577% of GDP in 2014 to 0.547% of 
GDP in 2025. In particular, cost for covering all children aged 0-3 will decrease from 0.155% 
GDP to 0.124% GDP due to decrease in their number over the projection period. Similarly, 
the total cost for covering all children (aged 0-18, as proposed in the amendment of the Law 
on Child Care and Protection) with the same benefit at 2.31% GDP per capital will slightly 
decrease from 0.684% of GDP in 2014 to 0.645% of GDP in 2025, in which the costs 
covering children aged 16-18 will also decrease from 0.107% GDP in 2014 to 0.098% GDP in 
2025. 
If the program will cover only children (aged 0-15) living in rural areas, the total cost 
will reduce from 0.399% GDP in 2014 to 0.337% GDP in 2025, which is mostly due to 
reduction in the cost for 0-3 group. Similar results can be observed for children, who are 
defined as those aged 0-18. Two contributing factors for such results include lower fertility 
rates and higher urbanization rate in Vietnam in the coming years. 
In contrast, if the program will cover only children living in urban areas, the total cost 
will slightly increase, from 0.177% GDP in 2014 to 0.21% GDP in 2025 (for children aged 0-
15) or from 0.209% GDP in 2014 to 0.248% GDP in 2015 (for children aged 0-18). The most 
important factor contributing to these increases is urbanization, which results in more children 
living in urban areas.  













Child population - Percent distribution by age and area, 2014-2025
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Compared to other estimates for Vietnam (such as UN and MOLISA, 2011) and other 
countries (such as those for Cambodia, Sri Lanca, and the Philippines), it is indicated that the 
total costs are similar. The most important policy questions include (i) how such costs will be 
translated into improving welfare for targeted children and (ii) how much fiscal space will the 
government of Vietnam have in the coming years.  
Table 24. Cost estimates for age-based universal cash transfer scheme, 2015-2025 
 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 
ALL CHILDREN 
0-3 0.155 0.155 0.155 0.154 0.154 0.153 0.151 0.148 0.143 0.136 0.130 0.124 
4-5 0.074 0.075 0.075 0.075 0.074 0.074 0.075 0.074 0.074 0.074 0.072 0.070 
6-10 0.176 0.177 0.178 0.178 0.179 0.179 0.179 0.180 0.180 0.180 0.181 0.181 
11-15 0.171 0.169 0.167 0.167 0.167 0.167 0.168 0.168 0.169 0.171 0.172 0.172 
16-18 0.107 0.103 0.101 0.099 0.098 0.096 0.096 0.096 0.096 0.096 0.097 0.098 
Total 0-15 0.577 0.575 0.574 0.574 0.574 0.574 0.572 0.570 0.566 0.561 0.554 0.547 
Total 0-18 0.684 0.678 0.675 0.673 0.671 0.670 0.668 0.666 0.662 0.657 0.651 0.645 
CHILDREN LIVING IN RURAL AREAS 
0-3 0.106 0.106 0.104 0.104 0.103 0.101 0.099 0.094 0.089 0.083 0.076 0.071 
4-5 0.051 0.051 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.049 0.049 0.049 0.048 0.047 0.045 0.043 
6-10 0.122 0.121 0.119 0.120 0.120 0.119 0.119 0.118 0.117 0.117 0.116 0.115 
11-15 0.121 0.118 0.114 0.113 0.112 0.111 0.111 0.109 0.109 0.110 0.110 0.109 
16-18 0.076 0.072 0.069 0.067 0.065 0.064 0.063 0.061 0.060 0.060 0.060 0.060 
Total 0-15 0.399 0.396 0.388 0.387 0.384 0.381 0.379 0.370 0.363 0.356 0.347 0.337 
Total 0-18 0.475 0.468 0.457 0.454 0.449 0.444 0.442 0.431 0.424 0.416 0.407 0.397 
CHILDREN LIVING IN URBAN AREAS 
0-3 0.049 0.049 0.050 0.051 0.051 0.052 0.052 0.053 0.054 0.054 0.053 0.053 
4-5 0.024 0.024 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.026 0.026 0.027 0.027 0.027 
6-10 0.055 0.056 0.058 0.059 0.059 0.060 0.060 0.062 0.063 0.064 0.065 0.066 
11-15 0.050 0.051 0.053 0.054 0.055 0.056 0.056 0.059 0.060 0.061 0.062 0.063 
16-18 0.031 0.031 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.033 0.033 0.035 0.036 0.036 0.037 0.038 
Total 0-15 0.177 0.179 0.186 0.187 0.190 0.193 0.193 0.200 0.203 0.205 0.207 0.210 
Total 0-18 0.209 0.210 0.218 0.220 0.222 0.226 0.227 0.235 0.239 0.242 0.244 0.248 
Source: Own calculations, using GSO (2011) 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Concluding remarks 
Viet Nam is at an important juncture where social protection system requires a major 
transformation to address the complex challenges and emerging risks that intensely affect 
children and families in the middle-income country context. While maintaining a high rate of 
growth making the most of the investment, demographic bonus and integration into the global 
and regional economy, the recent slower pace of development requires Viet Nam to adjust its 
strategies to reprioritize and maximize the available fiscal space for social protection in an 
efficient and effective way to address the multi-faceted challenges. Investment in social 
protection is thus an investment in sustaining the socio-economic development in an inclusive 
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manner. In particular, reducing poverty and increasing access to education, health and other 
material life conditions in the early years via a widely-covered social security system should 
be an imperative for major priority development pathways of Viet Nam given the major 
benefits with respect to mitigating widening gaps in achievement between advantaged and 
disadvantaged children, improving health outcomes, boosting earnings, and increasing the 
future return. The SDGs and Addis Ababa Action Plan on financing for development with 
focus on nationally-owned and sustainable social protection system serve as a key driver for 
accelerating the reform agenda in Viet Nam.  
Under the expected demographic changes and potential economic shocks, it is required 
that Viet Nam provide a comprehensive social protection to its citizens, including children. 
This study was aimed to estimate how cash transfer to children could  help to reduce their 
poverty as well as to increase access to education, health and other material life conditions. 
Our findings could be summarized as follows: (i) cash transfers would have a positive effect 
of income on school enrolment, and increased income resulted from cash transfers could 
significantly increase out-of-pocket (OOP) spending on education. More importantly, the 
effect could be higher for ethnic minorities and poor students; (ii) There were no significant 
effects of cash transfers on health care contacts (both impatience and outpatience) and out-of-
pocket spending on health care, but there was a significant effect of income on the probability 
of having health insurance; (iii) cash transfers would have a positive effect on poverty 
reduction for children; and (iv) cash transfers would be able to improve other welfare 
indicators for children, especially poor and ethnic minority children. In terms of cost, we 
found that the current proposed transfer level (i.e., VND 70,000/month/child, or equivalent to 
2.31% of GDP per capita in 2012) would cost 0.577% of GDP in 2014 and 0.547% of GDP in 
2025 if the program is universal for children aged 0-15, in which cost for covering all children 
aged 0-3 will decrease most due to decrease in their number over the projection period. 
2. Policy recommendations 
Based on our findings and international experiences, we would like to propose the 
following policy recommendations. 
First, as a part of household income, cash transfers would have positive impacts on 
various children’s welfare, such as reducing poverty, increasing school attendance, increasing 
probability to have health insurance. A such, cash transfers should be considered as an 
important tool to provide protection to children for their early childhood development. 
Though, please also note that cash transfers are not panacea for dealing all socio-economic 
and health issues of children; rather, a long-term vision and development of social policies for 
education and health for an aging population like Vietnam is really a prerequisite.  
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Second, among children, the poor and ethnic minority children are more vulnerable, and 
cash transfers always had large impacts on their education and health. Thus, promoting cash 
transfer program for these child groups would provide opportunities for them to be as the 
other groups. In particular, for the areas and provinces where a majority of poor and ethnic 
minority children are living, such a policy direction is extremely important, so as to build 
better human resources and thus promote economic growth and development in these 
locations.   
Third, as total fertility rate is decreasing, it is expected that the number of potential 
beneficiaries – i.e., children – will be smaller in the coming decades. Thus, government will 
be able to increase benefit level and coverage feasible fiscal space. Though money can be 
used for different purposes but what is important to be recognized is that many poor and 
disadvantaged children would have chances to access to and benefit from education and 
health care services. Also, higher government tax-based spending for cash transfers would 
require higher taxes, which in turn may change behaviors (both working and consumption) of 
tax payers. 
Last, but not least, quality of services to be provided along with cash transfer should 
also be emphasized, so as to make sure that the current benefits will be fully translated into 
socio-economic development of Vietnam. For instance, international experiences showed a 
critical lesson that increase in the use of education services via cash transfers did not result in 
significant learning improvements: the programs did not have a significant effect on 
achievement test scores in Mexico (Behrman et al., 2000) and Ecuador (Ponce and Bedi, 
2010) as well as in Cambodia’s CESSP (Cambodia Education Sector Support Project) (Filmer 
and Schady, 2009); for the Familias en Accíon in Colombia, Baez and Camacho (2011) found 
that beneficiary students were more likely to complete high school than non-beneficiaries, but 
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Table A.1. Summary of key cash transfer policies and programs for Vietnamese children 
No. Policy/Program Main contents Beneficiaries Benefit level 
1 
− Decree 49/2010/ND-CP, dated 
14 May 2010 
− Decree 74/2013/ND-CP dated 
15 July 2013 (amended Decree 
49) 
Regulations on exemption, 
deduction of tuition fee and 
support for study costs 
Children learning in  
kindergartens, orphaned pupils and 
students who are without support, 
or disabled with economic 
difficulties 
Exemption of tuition fee 
  Children in public kindergartens 
and pupils whose parents are 
categorized as poor people. 
 
  Children studying in schools for 
ethnic minorities 
 
  Ethnic minority pupils living in 
areas with difficult socio-economic 
conditions 
 
  Pupils studying in some special 
professional or hazardous work 
Deduction of tuition fee at 70% 
  Children in public kindergartens or 
pupils who are children of public 
servants who had occupational 
accidents/diseases and receiving 
regular social assistance 
Deduction of tuition fee at 50% 
Children in public kindergartens or 
pupils whose parents are poor 
people 
 
   Children in public kindergartens; 
orphaned pupils and students who 
are without support, or disabled 
with economic difficulties 
Support for study costs 
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No. Policy/Program Main contents Beneficiaries Benefit level 
   Children in public kindergartens or 
pupils whose parents are poor 
people (but these children are not 
those mentioned above) 
 
2 Decision 85/2010/QD-TTg dated 
21 December 2010 
Policies to support pupils  in public 
day-boarding schools and ethnic 
minority pupils in boarding 
schools in economically difficult 
areas 
Pupils  in public day-boarding 
schools  
− Meals per pupil: 40% of 
general minimum wage and not 
more than 9 months per years 
− Housing cost: for those who 
have to rent a house, 10% of 
general minimum wage and not 
more than 9 months per years   
  Ethnic minority pupils in boarding 
schools in economically difficult 
areas 
− Support for study equipment 
per year: VND 100,000 per 
pupil 
− Medical support per year: VND 
50,000 per pupil 
3 Decision 12/2013/QD-TTg dates 
24 January 2013 
Support to secondary pupils in 
economically difficult areas 
Ethnic minority pupils who (a) are 
studying in public secondary 
schools; (b) themselves, parents or 
their supervisors have permanent 
household registration in 
economically difficult areas; and 
(c) staying in boarding schools due 
to difficult transportation and 
location.  
− Meals per pupil: 40% of 
general minimum wage and not 
more than 9 months per years 
− Housing cost: for those who 
have to rent a house, 10% of 
general minimum wage and not 
more than 9 months per years   
   Kinh pupils living in economically 
difficulties communes/wards, and 
belonging poor households 
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No. Policy/Program Main contents Beneficiaries Benefit level 
4 
− Decree 67/2007 dated 13 April 
2007;  
− Decree 13/2010 dated 27 
February 2010;  
− Decree 136/2013 dated 21 
October 2013 
Regular (monthly) social 
assistance 
Orphaned for both parents; 
deserted but not yet adopted; 
orphaned for both parents and 
remaining persons are missing; etc. 
(Chapter 2, Article 5, Clause 1) 
− Age 0-4: VND 675,000 per 
month 
− Aged 4-16: VND 405,000 per 
month 
   HIV-affected children living in 
poor households. 
− Age 0-4: VND 675,000 per 
month 
− Aged 4-16: VND 540,000 per 
month 
  Foster care centers Children with disabilities who are 
cared in public centers 
− Age 0-4: VND 1,350,000 per 
month 
− Aged 4-16: VND 1,080,000 per 
month 
5 
− Decision 157/2007/QĐ-TTg 
dated 27 September 2007 
− Decision 1344/QĐ-TTg dated 
26 Aug 2009; 
− Decision 1196/QD-TTg dated 
19 July 2013 
Credit for students and pupils to 
support study costs, including 
tuition fee, money for textbook and 
tools, meal and housing costs, and 
transportation costs 
Pupils who (i) are orphaned of 
both parents; or (ii) orphaned of 
father or mother, while the other is 
not able to work. 
Per student per month: VND 
800,000 (Decision 157);  
VND 850,000 (Decision 1344); 
VND 1,100,000 (Decision 1196) 
 Pupils who are: 
- living in poor households; or 
. living in near-poor households 
 
 Pupils whose households are 
facing financial difficulties due to 
accidents, natural disasters, fire, 
epidemics in the time they are 
studying and these are proved by 
People’s Committee where pupils 
are living 
 
6 Joint Circular MoLISA-MoF- Guiding financial management and (Cash transfer pilots in Ha Giang, Children aged 0-3 living in poor 
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No. Policy/Program Main contents Beneficiaries Benefit level 
MoET 26/2014/TTLT-
BLDTBXH-BTC-BGDDT, dated 
22 September 2014 
implementation of the 
‘Strengthening Social Assistance 
System in Viet Nam’ funded by 
the World Bank. 
Quang Nam, Lam Dong, and Tra 
Vinh) 
households: VND 70,000 per 
month (for 12 months per year) 
  Children aged 3-15 living in poor 
households who are currently not 
attending schools: VND 70,000 
per month (for 9 months per year) 




Table A.2. Detailed cost projections for child cash transfers by age group and areas of living, 2014-2025 
ALL 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 
Population by age group 
0-3 6,065,277 6,126,986 6,183,967 6,235,421 6,288,053 6,321,528 6,284,644 6,210,853 6,054,670 5,819,344 5,574,018 5,366,175 
4-5 2,915,314 2,955,927 2,992,448 3,022,746 3,041,694 3,073,814 3,112,469 3,132,381 3,146,919 3,161,029 3,110,186 3,022,878 
6-10 6,913,805 7,007,371 7,107,934 7,210,868 7,311,219 7,403,916 7,480,751 7,563,079 7,638,023 7,703,821 7,763,093 7,824,023 
11-15 6,689,872 6,681,816 6,698,772 6,742,607 6,808,282 6,890,416 6,983,963 7,084,587 7,187,676 7,288,240 7,381,193 7,458,381 


























Population as % of total population 
0-3 6.70 6.70 6.69 6.67 6.66 6.63 6.53 6.39 6.18 5.90 5.61 5.37 
4-5 3.22 3.23 3.24 3.24 3.22 3.22 3.23 3.22 3.21 3.20 3.13 3.03 
6-10 7.64 7.66 7.69 7.72 7.74 7.76 7.77 7.78 7.80 7.81 7.82 7.83 
11-15 7.39 7.31 7.25 7.22 7.21 7.22 7.25 7.29 7.34 7.39 7.43 7.46 
16-18 4.65 4.47 4.37 4.29 4.23 4.17 4.15 4.14 4.15 4.17 4.20 4.24 
Total 29.61 29.37 29.23 29.14 29.06 29.01 28.93 28.82 28.67 28.46 28.20 27.93 
Cost of age-based universal coverage (% GDP) 
0-3 0.155 0.155 0.155 0.154 0.154 0.153 0.151 0.148 0.143 0.136 0.130 0.124 
4-5 0.074 0.075 0.075 0.075 0.074 0.074 0.075 0.074 0.074 0.074 0.072 0.070 
6-10 0.176 0.177 0.178 0.178 0.179 0.179 0.179 0.180 0.180 0.180 0.181 0.181 
11-15 0.171 0.169 0.167 0.167 0.167 0.167 0.168 0.168 0.169 0.171 0.172 0.172 
16-18 0.107 0.103 0.101 0.099 0.098 0.096 0.096 0.096 0.096 0.096 0.097 0.098 
Total 0-15 0.577 0.575 0.574 0.574 0.574 0.574 0.572 0.570 0.566 0.561 0.554 0.547 
Total 0-18 0.684 0.678 0.675 0.673 0.671 0.670 0.668 0.666 0.662 0.657 0.651 0.645 
RURAL 
Population by age group 
0-3 4,160,760 4,203,248 4,172,464 4,193,025 4,194,742 4,169,299 4,127,580 3,966,175 3,775,609 3,530,085 3,285,783 3,071,801 
4-5 1,985,760 2,011,287 2,006,587 2,028,833 2,033,520 2,033,299 2,062,648 2,041,365 2,030,599 2,012,127 1,941,827 1,845,804 
6-10 4,771,477 4,802,930 4,781,572 4,844,581 4,894,774 4,922,667 4,976,677 4,954,271 4,972,600 4,980,998 4,975,316 4,955,619 
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ALL 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 
11-15 4,731,270 4,668,273 4,570,867 4,569,851 4,579,167 4,594,616 4,630,943 4,605,666 4,637,239 4,678,832 4,724,142 4,721,574 
16-18 2,977,061 2,862,181 2,750,482 2,705,048 2,664,948 2,634,401 2,613,793 2,559,048 2,548,293 2,556,720 2,580,635 2,578,620 
Total 18,626,328 18,547,920 18,281,972 18,341,337 18,367,151 18,354,281 18,411,642 18,126,523 17,964,341 17,758,762 17,507,703 17,173,418 
Population as % of total population 
0-3 4.60 4.60 4.51 4.49 4.44 4.37 4.29 4.08 3.85 3.58 3.31 3.07 
4-5 2.19 2.20 2.17 2.17 2.15 2.13 2.14 2.10 2.07 2.04 1.96 1.85 
6-10 5.27 5.25 5.17 5.19 5.18 5.16 5.17 5.10 5.08 5.05 5.01 4.96 
11-15 5.23 5.10 4.94 4.89 4.85 4.82 4.81 4.74 4.73 4.74 4.76 4.72 
16-18 3.29 3.13 2.98 2.90 2.82 2.76 2.71 2.63 2.60 2.59 2.60 2.58 
Total 20.58 20.28 19.78 19.63 19.46 19.24 19.12 18.65 18.33 18.00 17.63 17.19 
Cost of age-based universal coverage (% GDP) 
0-3 0.106 0.106 0.104 0.104 0.103 0.101 0.099 0.094 0.089 0.083 0.076 0.071 
4-5 0.051 0.051 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.049 0.049 0.049 0.048 0.047 0.045 0.043 
6-10 0.122 0.121 0.119 0.120 0.120 0.119 0.119 0.118 0.117 0.117 0.116 0.115 
11-15 0.121 0.118 0.114 0.113 0.112 0.111 0.111 0.109 0.109 0.110 0.110 0.109 
16-18 0.076 0.072 0.069 0.067 0.065 0.064 0.063 0.061 0.060 0.060 0.060 0.060 
Total 0-15 0.399 0.396 0.388 0.387 0.384 0.381 0.379 0.370 0.363 0.356 0.347 0.337 
Total 0-18 0.475 0.468 0.457 0.454 0.449 0.444 0.442 0.431 0.424 0.416 0.407 0.397 
URBAN 
Population by age group 
0-3 1,904,517 1,923,737 2,011,503 2,042,395 2,093,311 2,152,229 2,157,064 2,244,678 2,279,062 2,289,258 2,288,235 2,294,374 
4-5 929,554 944,640 985,860 993,914 1,008,174 1,040,516 1,049,821 1,091,017 1,116,320 1,148,902 1,168,359 1,177,074 
6-10 2,142,328 2,204,441 2,326,362 2,366,287 2,416,445 2,481,249 2,504,074 2,608,809 2,665,423 2,722,823 2,787,777 2,868,404 
11-15 1,958,602 2,013,543 2,127,905 2,172,756 2,229,115 2,295,800 2,353,021 2,478,921 2,550,436 2,609,408 2,657,051 2,736,807 
16-18 1,233,761 1,230,057 1,288,854 1,306,803 1,324,013 1,347,167 1,380,188 1,463,656 1,515,753 1,558,108 1,592,022 1,656,335 









Population as % of total population 
0-3 2.10 2.10 2.18 2.19 2.22 2.26 2.24 2.31 2.33 2.32 2.30 2.30 
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ALL 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 
4-5 1.03 1.03 1.07 1.06 1.07 1.09 1.09 1.12 1.14 1.16 1.18 1.18 
6-10 2.37 2.41 2.52 2.53 2.56 2.60 2.60 2.68 2.72 2.76 2.81 2.87 
11-15 2.16 2.20 2.30 2.33 2.36 2.41 2.44 2.55 2.60 2.64 2.68 2.74 
16-18 1.36 1.34 1.39 1.40 1.40 1.41 1.43 1.51 1.55 1.58 1.60 1.66 
Total 9.03 9.09 9.46 9.51 9.61 9.77 9.81 10.17 10.34 10.47 10.57 10.74 
Cost of age-based universal coverage (% GDP) 
0-3 0.049 0.049 0.050 0.051 0.051 0.052 0.052 0.053 0.054 0.054 0.053 0.053 
4-5 0.024 0.024 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.026 0.026 0.027 0.027 0.027 
6-10 0.055 0.056 0.058 0.059 0.059 0.060 0.060 0.062 0.063 0.064 0.065 0.066 
11-15 0.050 0.051 0.053 0.054 0.055 0.056 0.056 0.059 0.060 0.061 0.062 0.063 
16-18 0.031 0.031 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.033 0.033 0.035 0.036 0.036 0.037 0.038 
Total 0-15 0.177 0.179 0.186 0.187 0.190 0.193 0.193 0.200 0.203 0.205 0.207 0.210 
Total 0-18 0.209 0.210 0.218 0.220 0.222 0.226 0.227 0.235 0.239 0.242 0.244 0.248 
 
